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Abstract
Democratization of finance in China is both effective and risky. This is a comprehensive
study of the benefits and risks associated with China’s Inclusive Finance Policy and the rapid
development of Chinese internet financial industry. Through a retrospective of the emergence
of finance, this study will introduce the concept of democratization of finance and evaluate its
development in China. The author further examines the approach of Inclusive Finance and
Internet-based financial industry and their contributions to the overall financial industry. In
addition, this study will also explore the role of Internet-based financial industry to Chinese
economy in the context of China’s economic transformation.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Democratization of Finance
1.1 Financial Democratization—Robert J. Shiller’s idea
To most people finance is an abstract subject that only draws mass attention during a
crisis. The rise of finance seems like that it only became important to people’s lives in the
recent centuries. However, finance has indeed been an indispensable element of civilization,
in terms of birth of culture, rise of empires and hierarchy. Traces of the subject can be found
in the oldest civilizations of mankind. After 4,000 B.C., the Sumerian people built the city of
Uruk that was based on herding and agriculture, complemented with fishing and hunting
(Goetzmann, 2016). The greatness of Uruk was that it had a highly developed economic
system that relied on a central distribution center. The economy of the city was developed so
well that it had a large variety of goods and materials where even the labor was specialized.
Within such an economy, the primordial essense of the most primary financial instrument
was developed: debt. Triggered by the profits——interest, the Sumerian people mastered the
practice of lending; and the new industry based on lending was passed on as a legacy to the
famous Babylonian dynasty. During the Babylon era, sophisticated mathematics was
developed that people were able to calculate compound interests (Goetzmann, 2016).
Moreover, among the unearthed writings could be found the ancient version of mortgages,
loan contracts, even partnership agreements, which are strong evidences of the highly
developed financial activities happened back then.
It wasn’t until relatively modern times that we discovered more surprising facts of this
period of ancient finance. In the 1920s, a Mesopotamian city of Ur was excavated, and an
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“ancient Wall Street” was spotted in the middle-upper class neighborhood near the center of
the city. Evidenced by a variety of tablets unearthed that recorded the activities that
“financiers of Ur” were involved with, “lenders played an important role in the ancient
economy of Ur” because they “supplied the silver money demanded by the temple”
(Goetzmann, 2016). It is important to note the importance and multi-roles that temple played
in the Sumerian society— “the entire machinery of the Sumerian economy ostensibly existed
to support the temples, which were considered the households of the gods” (Graeber, 2011).
The high status of temple in the social hierarchy is also an evidence of the uneven
distribution of power and wealth. Due to the absolute authority of silver money demanded by
the temple, those “financiers” from the middle-upper class created liquidity for the economy
by lending out petty money or emergency loans, avoided unnecessary storage and rot of
goods. Obviously, they were in control of the economic lifeblood of their civilization, which
is why the Ur period has been considered as “an early hothouse of capitalistic enterprise”
(Goetzmann, 2016). Moreover, the importance of finance also caught the sovereign’s
attention. The government published legal codes that protected property rights, which favored
the financiers’ interests, and even made the property rights superior to human rights. With the
authority of law, many financial instruments were widely used as tools of both enterprise and
sovereign power to achieve their goals.
From its beginning, finance has been a powerful industry among the elites; it was
supportive to productive enterprise and sovereign ruling. It was also harsh to ordinary people,
as evidenced by the exploitations put upon the working class, including the miring them in
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debts, solidifying the social hierarchies, and extracting taxes and rents from citizenry
(Goetzmann, 2016).
Followed the similar route, banking was also created for the middle or upper classes, and
its development was closely associated with capitalism. The emergence of banking in its
current form comes from ancient Athens since “Greeks invented banking, coinage, and
commercial courts” (Goetzmann, 2016, p.73). By the fifth century B.C., Greeks caught up to
the eastern civilizations in terms of “financial sophistication”. The Greeks were not limited to
the business of “petty money lending” or even major family-based financiers; rather they
built bank-like institutions that accepted “deposits of money for safekeeping”, which was
popular among merchants. Being similar to these ancient financial techniques and banking,
the emergence of banking in relatively modern Europe was also associated with debts and
money managing. The concept of bank in Europe was developed from money changing
industry and goldsmiths. It is worthy to note that these financial industries were also closely
related to the middle-upper class. In fact, the concept of banking, from its initial emergence
until pretty late in the history, can even be considered as a privilege for the upper class, since
the top percentile in almost all societies “exert influence on both the social landscape and the
political and economic order” (Picketty, 2014, p.182). The inequality embedded in the social
hierarchies is reflected clearly in the development of financial industry. Based on the
historical records, the most ancient banking business in the world was carried out by “the
drapers of Barcelona, who were probably the wealthiest class of merchants in the city”, and
the very first public bank was established by “the magistrates, and the city funds were
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responsible for the money placed in the bank” (Gilbart, 1837). This bank, even though it was
from ancient era, operated pretty maturely like a modern bank; it was in charge of
exchanging money, receiving deposits and discounting bills of exchange (Gilbart, 1837). In
1694, the very first joint-stock bank, the Bank of England, was established in the United
Kingdom. Being the first bank that was not controlled by the government, this bank operated
like a publicly-traded company nowadays, splitting its liabilities and profits among its
shareholders. The emergence of this bank is a great reflection of the highly advanced
financial system that Europe had centuries ago. This bank laid out a basic framework for the
development of the modern financial industry (Wang, 2015).
Since then, the banking and financial industries have developed rapidly in various
capitalist countries; and they have greatly promoted the accumulation of capital and
concentration of production. By the 17th century, modern banking emerged in Europe along
with several new practices, including reserve banking business and bank note issuance. This
relates to the interesting story of goldsmith. Back then, the wealthy British merchants would
store their gold in goldsmiths in London; the goldsmiths owned private vaults and they
charged for this kind of services. As an exchange of deposits for gold, a receipt would be
issued by the goldsmith to the clients, proving the quantity and quality of the gold or other
precious metal. Later on, the goldsmiths started to lend out money on behalf of the depositor,
which marked the development of modern banking (Investment & Income.com, 2011). The
goldsmiths’ practices created a new type of “money”— the debts of the goldsmiths which
could be considered as a commodity regulated by the sovereign. Interestingly, this is
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consistent with the heterodox understanding of money, which basically defines money as a
type of debt—“IOU” (Wray, 2009). In fact, British banks played a major role in the evolution
of modern banking. In 1695, the Bank of England issued its banknotes permanently for the
first time in the history; in the 17th century, British people also invented cheques for banks to
settle the payments; and in the 18th century, banks started to provide more services, including
clearing facilities, security investments, cheques and overdraft protection (Davies, 2002). But
up until this point, finance and banking were still mostly exclusive to the wealthy merchants
or aristocrats. However, the democratization of finance gradually emerged later, aroused a
trend towards involvement of broad public. In the early 19th century, there was the “savings
bank movement” in Great Britain, followed by a similar one in the United States (Shiller,
2012). These historical movements democratized banking to a better extent and endowed
low-income people with the incentives and more importantly the opportunities to experience
financial services, empowering the general households to access to appropriate financial
services (Erturk, Ismail, et al, 2007). By the 20th century, the basic financial activities were
pretty common among the ordinary people attributed to the democratization movements.
Speaking of the democratization of finance, an important contributor to this concept is
Robert James Shiller. Born March 29, 1946, Shiller is a well-known American Economist,
scholar and best-selling author. Besides from those mentioned titles, he is also a Sterling
Professor of Economics at Yale University; and he has been a research associate of the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) since 1980, etc. (Yale, 2019). Shiller also
jointly received the 2013 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his empirical
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analysis of asset prices (The Nobel Prize, 2013). Shiller has been focusing on the topic of
democratization of finance for years, and he thinks it is the inevitable trend that the whole
modern financial world is going towards. In his book Finance and the Good Society, Shiller
states that “the democratization of banking is a slow process, occurring over centuries,
benefiting from technological progress of various sorts, and still far from complete, even in
advanced countries” (Shiller, 2012). Ever since the initial democratization happened in the
19th century, the finance and banking industries have evolved so much because of numerous
innovations, and they have benefited the whole society in a revolutionary manner. However,
it’s worthy to note the amount of innovations experienced an explosive growth in the past
two decades, from late 1990s till today. In Shiller’s words, “over the past decades finance has
been increasingly democratizing feed on the rapid development of technology” (Shiller,
2012). During this rapid development period of technology-driven finance, a new term
became popular among the public: “Fin-Tech”, which describes the new technology that aims
to “improve and automate the delivery and use of financial services” (Kagan, 2019). A
typical example of an archetype of Fin-Tech innovation is the ATM machine, which not only
helped with the democratization of finance but also brought unprecedented convenience to
people’s daily life. Interestingly, from the perspective of industry evolution, there are
different opinions in defining development stages (Liao, 2017). On one hand, some scholars
divide the progress based on the historical revolutions that technology has caused to the
industry of finance. The progress of “Fin-Tech” is divided into three sections, as visualized in
Figure 1.
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1866-1968 is the era of the Fin-Tech 1.0, featured the globalization of finance, which
benefited from telegraph and telephone technology. 1987-2008 is the Fin-Tech 2.0. During
this period, the digital technologies were widely used in financial institutions, resulted in
significant improvements in efficiency. From 2009 till today, we have been experienced the
Fin-Tech 3.0, which is dominated by information technology and Internet financial
innovations (Arner & Barberis, 2015). On the other hand, many put the emphasis on how the
Fin-Tech have affected the market and people’s life in the last two decades. According to
Ron Suber, the President Emeritus of Proser Marketplace, there are four phases of Fin-Tech.
The first phase is called EAU: Education, Awareness and Understanding. Suber regards this
period as a time of establishing Fin-Tech as a “recognizable concept” among the general
public, and the goal of this period is to legalize the online financial services and to eliminate
the “fear of unknown” (Suber, 2016) The second phase is when big financial institutions start
to pay attention to the online market; their moves will further solidify people’s confidence
about this emerging industry. The third phase is when the Internet financial industry has
matured to an extent, and it starts to expand by cooperating with financial institutions like
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banks; this is also a period when the regulations start to join in. Last but not the least, the
forth phase is about the optimistic future, which will feature “rapid mergers, acquisitions, and
full adoption into the main stream” (Suber, 2016). Suber’s opinion is a great interpretation of
how Fin-Tech is closely related to the democratization, and it also offers insightful
predictions to the future of both this promising industry as well as the democratization of
finance.
As discussed above, among all the technological innovations, the most important one is
the Internet, which Shiller regards as “a great medium for democratizing finance”. In the last
two decades, accompanying the rapid evolution of the cyber technology, Internet finance has
become a hot industry global-wide, creating a great variety of online financial services and
new financial products. Based on advanced technology, this emerging industry that combines
applications of big data, cloud computing, social networking and traditional finance industry
pushes the democratization of finance to a brand-new level by creating revolutionary
approaches for people to manage their financial issues. Moreover, the Internet democratized
finance in a relatively equal way compared to the traditional financial industry. Internet
finance abandons some conventional procedures that exists in the traditional finance industry,
at the same time corrects the information asymmetry carried by those procedures (Li, 2013).
So, to a certain extent, Internet finance eliminates the drawbacks of the traditional finance
industry.
At the 10th Beijing International Finance Expo, the "Internet Era Wealth Management
Forum" was held, and the weaknesses of the traditional finance were throughly discussed on
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the forum. Lizong, Ji, the general manager of Beijing Yuanze Equity Investment Fund
Management Co., Ltd, claimed that traditional financial industry was centered on
standardized financial products, which were usually characterized by the tag of expensive,
inconvenient, and time-consuming; and there was a contradiction between the services
provided and nowadays individualized needs (Ji, 2014). Moreover, traditional financial
services are also associated with moral hazards and adverse selections because of the
information asymmetries within the industry. Information asymmetry, also known as
information failure, occurs when one party to a transaction has a greater material knowledge
than the other party (Kagan, 2018); and it usually refers to the situation when the seller has
better knowledge than the buyer. The asymmetrical circumstances can cause negative
consequences of adverse selection and moral hazards: adverse selection, like information
asymmetry, defines a situation where the sellers possess information that sellers don’t have,
and buyers faces the risk of purchasing “lemons” (Akerlof, 1970); on the other hand, moral
hazard represents the risk that a party provides misleading information or has an incentive to
undertake unusual risks to make profit (Pauly, 1968). The concept of asymmetric information
and the profit-driven nature of financial industry can lead some institutions to depart from the
original intention, and to break the rules in order to make more profit. The unscrupulous
practices of many shadow banks before the 2008 financial crisis are a great evidence, and
they eventually lead to the great collapse of the whole industry. In contrast, by applying
techniques like big data and cloud computing, Internet finance significantly reduces the
asymmetry of market information, and allows everyone to conduct financial activities
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without going through unnecessary intermediaries. Therefore, the financial industry can take
the Internet technology to a good use to eliminate the problems caused by information
asymmetry; and the evolved financial industry should take on more social responsibilities
while pursuing its own interests and form a virtuous circle for the whole economy. All in all,
this evolved financial industry further contribute to the democratization of finance…and its
dangers.
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1.2 Democratization of finance in China—Inclusive Finance & Internet innovations
Finance also has thousands of years of history in Chinese culture. As early as the Shang
dynasty (B.C. 1600—B.C. 1046), China had already created a fairly independent currency
system (Goezmann, 2016). The first institutions that dealt with financial businesses emerged
in the Tang Dynasty in the early 7th century. Though the scope of services provided were
relatively simple, these institutions were already independent on themselves. Later on, the
“money houses” appeared in the middle of the Ming Dynasty and the “money exchange store”
from the Qing Dynasty ran in the form of feudal organization, with weak financial strength
and small variety of services offered (Yao, 2007). Since these ancient style of banking
institutions could only provide the very basic services, they are quite different from modern
banking.

As shown in Figure 2 above, in 1897, the first Chinese commercial bank was established;
a few years later, the earliest “central bank”/bank of the country was established by the Qing
government in 1905. After the 1911 Revolution, China’s banking industry has further
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developed. however, due to the underdevelopment of China’s capitalism-oriented commodity
economy and the imperialist aggression, the banking industry developed in an abnormal
manner. During the later period of Nationalist ruling, the Central Bank, the Bank of China,
the Farmers’ bank of China and all other important bureaucratic-capitalism systems
monopolized the financial industry and controlled the lifeline of the Chinese economy (Yao,
2007). In 1948, the People’s Bank of China, which is the central bank of China now, was
established. Followed the newly constructed central bank, the original
bureaucratic-capitalism banks were reorganized into their new versions; this list of reformed
banks include the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications and Agricultural Cooperative
Bank. Later on, The China Investment Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China as well as the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China were established (Yao, 2007). These financial
institutions that were reformed or established after 1949 marked the emergence of the modern
banking industry in China. Since the Reform and Opening-up from the late 1970s, China’s
financial industry has kept the pace with the global trend. Certainly, the financial industry of
China is going towards the direction of democratization like its peers; and Chinese
government refers this move as the “Inclusive Finance”.
The concept of Inclusive financial sectors/financial inclusion was firstly brought up by
the United Nations in 2005, defining a financial system that was “designed to create enabling
environments for a wide range of retail financial service providers and to address gaps in the
policy, legal, and regulatory constraints that prevent a financial sector from being inclusive”
(UNCDF, 2018). Since this idea was consistent with China’s broad strategy of “inclusive
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development”, it was introduced into China by a scholar named Jinpu Jiao on the
Asia-Pacific Microcredit Forum in 2006, and spread rapidly (Wang, 2015). According to the
Research on the Development of China’s Inclusive Finance and Its Countermeasures,
China’s interpretation of Inclusive Finance has four main focus: inclusiveness of all societal
groups; equality across all services; diversity of the financial services; sustainability of the
Inclusive Finance. It was regarded as an important strategy in China’s economic plan. In
2013, premier Keqiang Li set the development of Inclusive Finance as a major goal of the
year. Before exploring the influence of Inclusive Finance, it’s necessary to discuss the role
that China’s sectoral financial system plays in terms of democratization of finance. China’s
financial system is distinctly segmented, and the different sectors are subject to different level
of regulatory controls. The financial institutions in the banking sector “are heavily regulated
with regards to which market they can access, who they can trade with and who they can
finance” (Lu, Bessler, et al, 2018). On the other hand, the non-banking sector, which is the
private section of China’s financial system, is much freer and it allows more possibilities. In
such a segmented system, there is a limit for those financial institutions in the banking sector
in terms of what they can do to promote the democratization of finance; but the environment
of the private section is a fertile soil for financial innovations to emerge. Therefore, most of
the financial innovations that aims to promote the democratization of finance are the
accomplishments of private companies. Among all of those innovations, the Internet finance
is undoubtedly one of the most contributing measures of democratizing finance. In addition
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to the existing prosperity, the government’s focus on Inclusive Finance certainly added some
catalyst to the industry of Internet finance.
The industry of Internet finance in China has developed so fast that it has drawn massive
attention across cities and villages. Aside from the “new online version” of traditional
financial institutions, the stars of this industry are those new innovations, including
peer-to-peer lending, third-party payment and Internet virtual currency, etc. Amongst the
wave of Internet finance, there are several legendary companies playing leading roles.
Alibaba Group is a great representative of them. Being a multinational conglomerate that
specializes in e-commerce, retail, Internet and technology, Alibaba has been a pioneer in the
Fin-Tech industry. Alibaba launched Alipay, which is a third-party online payment platform,
through a subsidiary company Ant Financial in 2004, and Alipay quickly occupied the
dominant market position in the whole Chinese market and expanded its businesses. In 2013,
Alipay launched a whole new online financial platform called “Yu’ebao (余额宝)”.
Yu’ebao is a unique financial innovation to China that pushes the democratization of
finance in China to an extreme level. It is a cash management platform that allows users to
earn appreciation in their Alipay account balance. Moreover, it is also connected to the main
online payment function of Alipay, so it allows users to withdraw their money from Yu’ebao
to spend at any time they want. After its initial launch, Yu’ebao has attracted a massive user
group thanks to its convenience, high return rate and low risk levels as it was promoted.
According to an article published on Forbes, Yu’bao was hailed as the “fund for the masses”,
because it removes the entry barriers that hindered small individual investors from making
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higher returns than traditional bank deposits (Xie, 2017). This platform created a whole new
way for people to finance their asset. By using Yu’ebao, people can invest as little as ￥0.1
whenever and where-ever, which is unimaginable for conventional banks or funds. From
2013 to present, Yuebao has not only raised awareness of asset management among masses,
but also helped Tian Hong Yu’ebao Monetary Fund to become the biggest monetary fund in
China. As shown in Figure 3 below, due to the Yu’ebao effect, the asset management scale of
this monetary fund has boosted over the past years.

By 2017, Yu’ebao Monetary Fund has become the largest monetary fund in the world
with the scale of $165.6 billion, surpassed the $150 billion scale of the money market fund
managed by JP Morgan Chase (Lucas, 2017). Moreover, the asset management scale of this
whole platform has reached ¥1.8 trillion (about $268 billion) in 2018. For the first time in
history, the total size of Yu’ebao has surpassed the overall amount of individual demand
deposits of the “Four Big Banks” in China, which had a balance of ¥179.86 billion (about
$26 billion) in 2017. To understand this jaw-dropping scale better, it’s important to realize
that the total GDP of the bottom 20% of nations from the 2017 ranking is less than size of
money managed by Yu’ebao (Sina, 2018). In general, Yu’ebao has grown so big that it takes
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a huge portion of the whole Chinese economy; and it is considerably a miracle of the
democratization of finance.
All in all, the emergence of finance and banking in China was also associated with the
inequality in social hierarchy, since those financial services were somehow exclusive to the
middle and upper class. Fortunately, the reform and opening-up brought new energy to
modern China, and it revolutionized these exclusive industries: by integrating the factor of
Internet technology, China has achieved a significant progress in democratizing financial
services and conducting Inclusive Finance. However, advancement is a double-edged sword;
the considerable achievements that China has in the Fin-Tech industry also carries huge
potential risks. Nowadays, the evaluation and management of such risks is an essential key to
the well-being of Chinese economy.
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Chapter 2: Benefits and risks of Internet financial innovations in China
2.1 The advantages of financial democratization through Internet in China — Alibaba
Empire: Yu’ebao & Alipay as the example
In recent years, China has been an important and active participant in the inclusive
financial developments. By conducting the Inclusive Finance policy, China has made
significant progress in democratizing financial services to all the levels of the society. The
Chinese government applied diverse methods to develop the Inclusive Finance. For instance,
the People’s bank of China, which is the central bank of China, has established thousands of
new banking branches as a pilot projects in the rural areas since 2010 to help farmers to
conduct regular financial/banking services; in 2011, the People’s Bank of China issued the
“Notice on Promoting Bank Cards to help with Farmer’s withdrawals”, requesting the
promotion of the pilot project, and setting a clear goal of helping all the rural areas within
China to be able to provide the basic withdrawals and savings services (The People’s Bank of
China, 2011); by the end of 2017, the overall amount of convenient financial branches in the
rural areas has achieved 914, 000 (Sohu, 2018). Moreover, in order to conduct the practice of
Inclusive Finance thoroughly, a large amount of the commercial banks in China have set up
new departments solely for developing the Inclusive Finance (Sohu, 2018). These efforts
made by the traditional financial institutions are effective ways of promoting basic financial
services in rural areas; However, it’s necessary to consider that even though these branches
eliminate the physical barrier for peasants to access to basic financial services, the other
barriers of conducting Inclusive Finance still exist. The emergence of those newly built
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branches results in increasing amount of rural financial institutions, revolutionizing financial
vehicles that peasants could access to, and optimizing the relative laws to regulate financial
services in the rural areas (Cai, 2016). However, this kind of “exogenous assistance”
provided by the government cannot solve the real difficulties of rural financing; and many
exogenous financial institutions deviated from the original intention of the government
setting up such institutions and shifted their focus from regular peasants to rich land lords and
even small/middle sized companies in order to make more profits (Sun, 2014). Furthermore,
the large amount of exogenous financial institutions also hinders the development of local
financial institutions in rural areas, which really provides the basic services in need to
peasants. In essence, in spite of the large number of branches being installed in rural areas, it
is fair to claim that the Inclusive Finance conducted through the traditional financial industry
in rural areas of China is quite superficial.
In addition to mixed impacts caused from the contributions of the traditional financial
institutions, the efforts made by the industry of Internet finance should not be overlooked in
promoting Inclusive Finance. As mentioned before, the Fin-Tech industry plays a vital role in
the democratization of finance. By applying the digital technology, the Fin-Tech industry
kicked off a new conceptual method of developing Inclusive Finance, and it has aroused
widespread attention from not only every level of the Chinese society but also some
well-known international financial institutions around the world, including the World Bank
(Huang, 2016). Therefore, it is fair to claim that information technology utilized in
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democratization of finance has become the focus of the development of Inclusive Finance in
China.
Beside the fact that Fin-Tech industry is a great combination of the technology progress
and the concept of democratization, it is also a unique invention that meets the need of the
times and makes breakthroughs in the traditional ways of finance to promote further
developments and upgrades of the whole financial industry. The Fin-Tech industry has
obvious advantages compared to the traditional practice of Inclusive Finance; and the
positive impacts brought by it benefits not only the economy but also people’s daily life. As
an illustration, for most of Chinese people who live cities and relatively developed rural areas
online payments count for more than half of their daily expenses, including grocery shopping,
paying bills, etc. For the young generation that is used to these Fin-Tech innovations, they
basically buy anything they need through online payments like Alipay and they barely use
cash or physical cards. The Fin-Tech industry abandons the limitations and exclusiveness of
the traditional financial industry, meets the needs of more users, expands the scope of the
financial industry, lowers the threshold of the financial industry, and provides new
opportunities and directions for the development of the financial industry (Zhong, 2016).
These advantages are specifically embodied in the following aspects: First of all, the
transaction cost of services provided by the online financial platforms are significantly lower
than that of the traditional financial industry. The “costs” mean more than the superficial
price tag, but also represents the time consumed and transportation costs. Relying on the
virtual platforms, the Fin-Tech industry abandons the clichés of the traditional
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finance—complexity and inconvenience involved in practices. In addition to being the
solution of information asymmetry, the Fin-Tech innovations also achieves the filtration,
selection, and simplification of information, making the whole transaction process easier
without consuming unnecessary costs. Without the restrictions of time and places, the
financial services provided online are more systemically, modernized with lower costs
(Zhong, 2016). Yu’ebao is a great representative of the Fin-Tech innovations to show this
trait. The absolute zero cost of its service and the automatic procedures provides the customer
the smooth services that can be completed in a few seconds. This trait is even more
significant for platforms that are associated with financial loans. Usually, the credit
assessment and lending are automatically completed based on big data; on many platforms,
the borrower can get the money in about three minutes with the cost of less than 1 Yuan,
which is thousands time less than the average cost of 2,000 Yuan of loan in the traditional
financial industry (Xie, 2017). Moreover, because of the simplified trading process that relies
on digital technology, the efficiency of the online financial services is much higher than the
traditional financial industry. It’s fair to claim that the online financial serving system are
somehow “man-less”—the whole Internet and data based serving system can work on its own
without much human intervention (Jia, 2018). Because of this reason, the standardized
practices can serve thousands of customers at the same time, resolving the problem of
customer waiting. In Yu’ebao’s case, the number of users has already exceeded 300 million
(Tianhong, 2019). With a powerful server, Yu’ebao is able to process the daily businesses of
millions of users, which is impossible in the traditional finance. Also, the online financial
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firms usually provide a wide range of services. Breaking down the thresholds of traditional
financial services, the Fin-Tech companies satisfy a greater range of customers with
comprehensive services. For instance, as mentioned above, Yu’ebao is just an affiliated
branch of a greater platform——Alipay; the services provided by the Alipay platform
includes transactions between users, payment for mobile commerce, payment for credit card
bills, payment for utilities, Yu’ebao (cash management), local living suggestions that include
coupons and promotions, and charity donations, etc. Having the great variety of services and
the efficient style of operation, platforms like Any Financial achieve “win-win” situations for
themselves and their users, actualize the concept of democratization of finance by making
finance an integrated part of people’s life. Last but not the least, the online financial industry
contributes to the management of risks. Due to the restriction of information collection and
information processing methods, traditional financial institutions still have many
shortcomings in risk monitoring and early warning. Because of this drawback, the traditional
financial institutions have also been working on introducing big data and Internet technology
(Xie, 2017). On this aspect, online platforms are much advanced. Taking the process of credit
assessment as an example, the Alipay platform can obtain the historical credit record of the
users in a few seconds using the big data technology. By integrating and analyzing the
fragmented information of the users, Alipay can easily calculate the credit scores. However,
in the traditional financial institutions, the credit officers need to collect information by
conducting in-site investigations, and they need to review various materials to come up with
the evaluation. It’s important to note that the accuracy of this evaluation may also be
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questionable due to the personal opinions of the credit officers. On a broader scale, the
Internet financial industry can reduce all kinds of risks that are associated with financial
activities by applying the digital technology. It can track, integrate, and analyze all the
samples from the database to capture the precursors of risk disclosure (Xie, 2017). Also,
according to the different level of credibility of users, the Internet financial institutions are
able to provide different products targeting different groups, which lowers the risks while
increasing the revenue (Jia, 2018). Last but not the least, the problem of adverse selection is
also hard to be recognized by customer in the traditional financial services, since the
transaction process is time-consuming and non-transparent. Due to the complicated
procedures in the traditional financial industry that is unknown to ordinary customer, the
financial agents may also undertake moral hazard to chase more profits.
With all of the competitive advantages discussed above, the Internet financial industry
lowers the barrier of finance for the whole society by resolving many difficulties and
problems encountered by the traditional financial industry, including not enough branches,
low revenue, high cost, narrow demographics of customers, and high potential risks, to name
a few; and these Fin-Tech innovations should be considered as the best way of conducting
Inclusive Finance in nowadays.
However, the dangers of automation and risk that accompanies euphoria of growth and
technological advancements is something that history has seen before, and they usually bring
disastrous consequences.
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2.2 The drawbacks of Internet-based financial activities--P2P case study & Hyman
Minsky’s instability theory
The prosperous development of Internet finance industry is not perfect, because it is
accompanied by underlying risks. Even though the Internet financial innovations are being
used as the dominant method for Inclusive Finance in China, it’s necessary to understand that
advanced technology can also contribute to the progress of fraud other than positive
developments; and the cyber-security problems as well as non-comprehensive regulation
issues associated with the rapidly developing Internet financial industry should also be
concerns. In general, against the backdrop of a complex and fast-changing economic and
financial environment, China's Internet finance development faces many risks, including
regulatory risks, credit risks, and so on. The case of peer-to-peer (P2P) online borrowing
platforms is a great illustration of these negative aspects.
The summer of 2018 was a nightmare for millions of Chinese individuals who invested
their money on the P2P online loan platforms. From June to July, more than two hundred of
Chinese P2P platforms crashed. Ironically, this was not the first time that Chinese P2P
industry experiences a wide-range crashes. According to the Secretary-General of the
national committee of cyber financial security of China, there have been more than 4800
problematic P2P platforms detected since June 2015. The committee also stated that the P2P
industry of China is a complicated mix of platforms that carry quite different levels of
credibility. Among all of these platforms, there are a number of the so-called “online loan
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financial companies” are just trying to make profit out of financial sleights of hand. The
chaos in this industry and the behind realities are worthy of investigation.
P2P (peer-to-peer) is an online financial loan method that allows individuals to borrow
and lend out money through a third-party platform, which connects both sides and manage
the flow of the money. It has entered China many years ago, but this industry didn’t boom
until a government policy in 2014, which highly encouraged people to start their own
businesses. Following publication of the law, many people flowed into the trendy “online
financial service” industry to set up their own companies, including many P2P online loan
platforms. According to an analysis essay published on a Chinese online loan forum
(www.wdzj.com), there was an important concept being ignored—the reality of finance has
determined that the entrepreneur is risking the wealth of others to make profit. If succeed, the
entrepreneur benefits the most; but if failed, the loss will be undertaken by the other
participants. Hence, new creation in the financial industry carry a negative externality. Also,
the online sector of financial industry in China was not mature at that time with only
incomplete regulations. In short, this industry was not suitable for massive amount of
innovations and startups. This concept has buried a fuse for later crashes.
After the 2014 policy, the P2P industry has vastly developed for 4 years, along with
many problems. Based on the data from the largest online database of P2P, the total number
of P2P crashes in 2015 was 867, and the accumulative number of collapses has already
reached 4,743. Figure 4 below is shown on the same website—there are always about 50 or
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more platforms being reported as problematic/closed every quarter since the beginning of
2015.

As shown in the Figure 4, the new number of problematic platforms has peaked for
many times. Its latest peak, however, which happened during summer 2018, has finally
caused a significant negative public effect and raised a lot of awareness from society. This
round of crashes firstly appeared in Nanjing. Due to the promotion of several real estate
projects in Nanjing, which requires clients putting a certain amount of money as bank savings
in order to participate in the “real estate lottery”, many P2P users withdrew their money from
platforms and put into banks (Yi, 2010). All of a sudden, several platforms could not
overcome the liquidity problem, so the crashes began. Many people, no matter if they have
invested in these P2P platforms or not, started to be curious about the real reasons that are
behind these unstoppable collapses.
Even though these P2P platforms crashed down in many different ways, including
platform missing, not allowing withdraws, platform defrauding, operation suspending, police
intervention, principle escaping, controversial platforms, platform liquidating, and platform
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deferring, these platforms do have some similar features. According to an analysis article
published on the largest online database for Chinese P2P platforms, 80% of the problematic
platforms are created in 2015 and later, which means that their operation time are relatively
short; Also, 83% of these problematic platforms didn’t complete their bank deposition;
Moreover, 70% of the platforms provided higher returns than bank savings. Behind these
shared features are the main causes of these crashes: the illegal operations and regulation
issues.
There are two typical illegal operations in P2P industry. In the original definition of
P2P, the third party only works as an agency that connects the lender and the borrower
together, without any capital precipitation. However, China P2P platforms does not work in
the same way. As the article from Phoenix Media claims, 95% of current China P2P
platforms have their own fund-pools, which differentiate these platforms from the true P2P
business. This illegal operation of fund-pool is created because lots of Chinese investors are
not very mature, which means that they refuse to take the risk of defaults. So, the platforms
are in charge of making up the payment if the borrower defaults, that’s why they need
fund-pools to maintain their liquidity, which means to use “new money” to payback “old
debts”. Another type of illegal operation is that some platforms are created for bad initiatives
other than P2P business. Some are set up in order to raise funds for the other business owned
by the owner of platform. Some are just created in order to earn the “quick money” through
fake investment projects. Once the money is obtained, and principle/manager then run away.
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These so-called P2P platforms are not doing the original P2P business in a proper manner,
and that fact has contributed to their collapses.
As mentioned above, incomplete regulations have always been a weakness of China’s
online financial industry and the regulation issues also play an important role in this round of
crashes. For the special case of P2P businesses, the regulations are not only incomplete, but
also controversial. The most important regulation issue in this round of P2P collapses is
related to a government announcement from end of 2017. In this announcement, government
claimed that all the P2P platforms are required to go through the rectification and official
registration by June 2018, or they need to be shut down (Huang, 2016). Lots of P2P platforms
actually treated this very seriously because they wanted to turn themselves into formal
companies that are nationally certified. So many of them adjusted their fund-pool/operation
methods and suspended their new business according to the rectification requirement.
However, suddenly the government claimed that registration will be delayed, but all of these
platforms’ fund-pools are under monitoring so that they cannot take the “new money” to pay
back the “old debt”. So, the fund chain was broken and caused lots of P2P crashes. Some
people may argue that these crashes are due to government’s trick, but it’s actually obvious
that government was just trying to squeeze out the bubble from the P2P industry.
In addition to this specific government trick, the general regulations in this P2P
industry are quite weak. First of all, there are almost no supervision about the people who
work in this industry. In the traditional financial industry, anyone who runs an individual
financial institution need to pass certain qualification exams or certification process. But in
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the P2P industry, the process of setting up a brand-new business is very easy and does not
require much qualifications. The fact of incomplete supervisions to the people in this industry
accumulated many potential risks, not only to investors, but also to the industry itself.
Another important regulation issue is that the past regulations could not guarantee the
credibility of the information published on these P2P platforms. This weakness allowed
enough room for some platforms to raise funds using fake investment projects/unreal
information. This is actually crucial to the online financial services—if investors cannot even
access the real information, how can they manage their risks? In order to solve these
problems, it’s necessary for government to complete the regulations/restrictions to this
industry in order to prevent the collapses in the future.
Besides the drawbacks and policy issues discussed above, the development of Inclusive
Finance using the Internet financial industry also has some problems on a broader scale.
Among the problems, an important concern is the diversification issue associated with
Yu’ebao. As mentioned before, the scale of wealth managed by Yu’ebao has achieved an
incomparable figure, and it plays a critical role in maintaining the health of China’s money
market. The fact that it is been relied too much has made this Internet financial platform “too
big to fail”. It has become the biggest “bank” in China itself at the same time when it brought
shocks to the traditional banks. According to Bloomberg, Yu’ebao and its parent company
“Ant Financial Services Group” has grown too big and it has caused concerns to Chinese
policy makers, worrying that “companies like Ant Financial would pose systematic risks to
China’s $12.7 trillion economy” (Bloomberg, 2018). Evidenced by Figure 5, the scale of
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money financed by this titan in Chinese Fin-Tech industry is beyond people’s imagination,
and it of course would raise concerns to all the participants of Chinese economy. According
to Dong Ximiao, who is a senior researcher at Renmin University of China, “Ant Financial
has become too big to fail. Any mishap could lead to market or even social disorder’’
(Bloomberg, 2018). The government is no exception: Chinese policy makers are worried that
may “post systemic risks to the nation’s $12.7 trillion economy” (Bloomberg, 2018). In
general, the concentration level of wealth accumulated in the Fin-Tech industry may cause
serial bad outcomes, including liquidity problems, credit crisis, and a potential “Minsky
moment”.

According to Hyman Minsky, a celebrated heterodox economist, “stability is
destabilizing” (Minsky, 1992). Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis is about the
essentially unstable reality of financial markets. In his hypothesis, the accumulation of debts
in non-government sector drives crisis, and there are three balance sheet positions of financial
market in the non-government sector: Hedge, Speculative and Ponzi (Minsky, 1992). Hedge
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means that the borrower’s expected income flows are sufficient to meet principle and interest
payments. Speculative means that borrowers only have enough income to pay the interests.
Ponzi means that borrowers cannot even pay the interests using their incomes, so they need to
borrow even more to pay the interests of their existing loans (Minsky, 1992). From Hedge to
Speculative to Ponzi, these three stages have increasingly smaller margins of safety as well as
greater risks. Minsky’s theory indicates that the financial crises are naturally created in
capitalism because the prosperous economic performance would encourage borrowers and
lenders to be progressively reckless and to develop risky financial products. As Ponzi finance
appears in an economy, many financial institutions would find “novel ways to evade
prudential regulations” and conduct many risk-taking financial activities in order to make
more profits (Chancellor, 2017, p.9). So, as the debts accumulate in the economy, the risks
are also generated and accumulated in financial markets. The strong financial structure of an
economy will naturally become fragile as the expansions go on because there will be more
and more risks involved due to increasing amount of speculative borrowings and Ponzi
borrowings. Eventually, any small crashes in the financial market, like financing costs rise or
lower income, can cause a series of defaults throughout the whole economy, and that will
lead to a financial crisis, specifically a rapid de-leveraging, which is a “Minsky moment”.
The best demonstration of Minsky’s hypothesis is the 2008 financial crisis: a few years after
the previous shock, the economy of the United States was going through a relative stable
period, culturing the booming of the mortgage market. As this trend of mortgage kept
developing, more and more people were attracted into this market by the varied financial
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instruments developed by many institutions. When the wave came to the high point, most of
participants in the financial market thought they were experiencing the once-in-a-lifetime
boom, which in fact was the illusory prosperity built on bubbles. Then, in late 2008, the
bubbles burst, making countless dreams and illusions crashed, punching the well-being of the
whole economy of the United States.
Many lessons can be learned from the United States’ experience, but the most
important takeaway should be that it’s necessary to avoid illusionary prosperity and fragile
economic structure. However, unfortunately, these underlying threats simultaneously grow
along with the democratization of finance. The convenience that financial innovations bring
to the society is a double-edged sword. While these democratization-aimed practices
drastically simplify the way that people finance, they also bring enormous amount of risks:
interestingly, the stimulus brought by automation of financial system in China is parallel to
the highly-active financial market of the United States before 2008 crisis. Due to these
financial innovations, the barrier for credit is significantly lowered on a large scale, thereby
relaxing the prudence of loans throughout the financial system and increasing the overall
level of leverage. Therefore, the investment scale of the whole society also goes up,
generating more and more speculative practices that are harmful to the well-being of the
financial system. The hotness of China’s real estate market can be considered as the
aftermath of this phenomenon. Due to the immature development of investment environment
plus the growth wave in the real estate industry, most of Chinese investors believe that real
estate is the best asset to invest in. The nationwide real estate industry in China has been
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experiencing a huge growth in recent years with the house prices skyrocketing, indicating the
overheating within the real estate industry. According to Knight Frank Global Residential
Cities Index, Chinese cities accounted for four of the world’s top five performing cities with
Shenzhen leading the rankings, recording phenomenal price growth of 62.5% in the year to
Q1 2016. This is followed by Shanghai (30.5%), Nanjing (17.8%) and Beijing (17.6)”
(Knight Frank, 2016). Just like the bubble within the U.S. mortgage market, the irrational
boom of Chinese real estate industry is heavily influenced by speculative purchases. As
shown in Figure 6 below, the demographic distribution of house buyers experienced a drastic
change during the past decade. The investment-driven purchases grew and squeezed the share
of other types of purchases. More and more people rush into the real estate market in order to
make great profits out of flipping houses. Gradually, Chinese people’s understanding of real
estate is more likely to be an investment vehicle rather than a place to live. Apparently, the
real estate industry in China has deviated away from its fundamentals, and it is filled with
speculative investments and the irrational optimism.
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An important factor that contributes to this phenomenon is that the development of
domestic-investment environment in China is still far from completed. Even though Chinese
people’s financial access has been widened by those democratization practices, the most of
Chinese investors still face the problem of lack of high-quality investment assets and
investment knowledge (Yi, 2010). According to a report published by Research Center for
China Household Finance in Southeastern University of Finance and Economics, the
proportion of real estate in Chinese households' asset allocation has exceeded 77%; also, the
data shows that many Chinese families with junior high education or below put more than 80%
of their overall property in real estate. The phenomenon of less-educated group investing a lot
into real estate is a great illustration of why China still has a long way to go in terms of real
democratization of finance, which will not only include popularization of financial services
but also focus on Chinese people’s financial awareness and financial literacy. Only by
combining the improvement of people’s understanding of finance and practices of
democratization, China can make sound progress in popularizing beneficial financial services
and constructing a healthy financial industry, avoiding the possible “Minsky Moment”.
All in all, even though democratization of finance has brought phenomenal changes to
Chinese financial industry, it also exposes many problems that are associated with the
limitations and underdevelopments of the overall structure of Chinese financial market. Even
the Internet financial industry is still in a stage of exploration and development. There are
still certain challenges in the construction of industrial infrastructure, the improvement of the
regulatory system, the establishment of a sound legal system, and the protection of consumer
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rights. It’s important for Chinese policy makers to continue making necessary regulations that
can catch the rapid evolving trend in this industry in order to secure the interests of mass who
rely on this industry on every aspect of their lives, thus to maintain the normal operation of
Chinese economy.
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Chapter 3: The role of Internet Finance in the context of China’s economic
transformation
3.1 The production-dominated economic model of China in the past 40 years
In the modern history of China, 1978 should be considered as a remarkable turning
point. In December 1978, the Central Committee of China held the epoch-making Third
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee. This meeting had opened China’s door
that had been closed and dusted for decades to the external world that is full of opportunity;
and it had settled the major decisions of China’s reform and opening up; it also had
established the fundamental national policy centered on economic construction. From then on,
China began its reform and opening up as well as its unique path of socialism. It’s necessary
to note that reform and opening up is a very important period for Chinese economy, because
it marks the end of Mao Zedong’s reign and the starting point of a new era, which is
represented by China's dramatic economic reforms and significant economic growth. This
drastic economic reform developed and implemented by Deng Xiaoping have succeeded in
transforming the Chinese economy from the chaotic aftermath of Mao Zedong’s regime and
his “economic experiments” into a well-functioning economy, evidenced by the timeline
below.
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As shown in Figure 7, since the reform and opening up in 1978, the Chinese economy
has achieved rapid growth for about 40 consecutive years. From 1978 to 2017, the GDP of
China has grown from ¥364.5 billion (about $54 billion) to more than ¥80 trillion (about $12
trillion). In the past 40 years, China’s nominal GDP has boosted by about 220 times, which is
evidenced by the significant growth in GDP per capita. In 1978, the nominal GDP per capita
was only ¥381 (about $57); however, it has exceeded ¥5,3000 (about $8,000) in 2017.
Moreover, the average annual growth rate of real GDP during this period is also remarkable,
especially from 1978 to 2011, when the annual growth rate has achieved 9.7% (Ma, Han,
2018). In addition to the domestic growth, China’s contribution to the growth of world
economy also has been increased: The share of China’s GDP in the world was only 1.8% in
1978, and China only ranked as the 11th economy in the world; thanks to the rapid
developments, China exceeded Italy to in 2000 and became the 6th in the world; in 2005 to
2007, China surpassed France and Germany respectively; in 2010, China also exceeded Japan
and became the world second largest economy (He, 2018).
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According to IMF data, global GDP in 2012 was $71.28 trillion. To break it down into
details: the European Union contributed $16.41 trillion; the United States contributed $15.65
trillion; and China’s contribution was $8.25 trillion, which was more than half of the US
GDP. By 2017, China’s GDP was equivalent to $12.3 trillion, accounting for about 15% of
the world’s total economy, representing an increase of 13% compared to the data of 1978 (He,
2018). Figure 9 below shows a clear trend of China’s economic growth and its contribution to
the world economy over the past 40 years: started from only 1.75% of the global economy,
China’s GDP has grown 82 times and made it the world’s second largest economy.
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As demonstrated by the discussion above, it is fair to claim that China’s economy has
grown by leaps and bounds. Currently, China is at the forefront of the world, with rapid
economic development, rapid urbanization, remarkable developments in science and
technology, increasing international competitiveness, and prosperous trading process with
other economies. Last but not the least, China’s economic growth has brought a tremendous
change to people’s living standards. In just 40 years, the accomplishments China has
achieved are rare in history. These rapid developments are driven by various reasons,
including international trade, demographic dividend, etc.
First of all, international trade has played a huge role in promoting the growth of
China’s economy in the past decades. Within the broad concept of international trade, the
industrial shift is an important factor. Under the context of economic globalization, China
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successfully caught the chance from international industrial shift, and turned itself into a
giant producer. Back in the 1970s, Japan has already become a developed country. Because
of the oil crisis and economic crisis happened during the 1970s, Japan and other developed
countries started to focus on technological developments, including new energy, new
materials and other knowledge-intensive industries. At the same time, the developed
countries tried to shift the labor-intensive industries that costed too much capacity, which
included steel industry, textile industry, etc., away from their own economies (Guo, 2015).
Japan shifted its old industries to the surrounding Asian areas in the form of foreign
investments in order to utilize the cheap labor force in those areas. Because of this industrial
shift, the “Four Asian Tigers” emerged: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan
went through rapid economic developments and industrialization, and they became
high-income economies by vigorously developing those labor-intensive industries (Chang,
2006). These four areas smartly used their relative cost advantages and benefits of accepting
external investments and technologies to boost their overall GDP through international trade.
Moreover, they also learned the whole procedure of how to do this kind of industrial shift.
Later in the 1980s and the 1990s, after the “tigers” had risen, they joined the team of
developed countries/areas and they started to shift these labor-intensive industries out as well.
This time, Thailand, Malaysia, and most importantly mainland China, got the chance. This
industrial shift has paved the way for China becoming the major manufacturing power in the
world. By the 1990s, the economy of mainland China has been reformed and developed for a
few years, and the investment environment of mainland has also been greatly improved (Guo,
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2015). Moreover, at the same time, the economic globalization and advanced technology
developments have brought tremendous changes to the world economy. In order to maintain
their competitive advantages, the developed countries led by the United States and Japan
have begun a new round of industrial reconstructions and upgrades (Guo, 2015). This reason
further motivated the shifting of the labor-intensive industries from developed areas to the
developing countries. With the foreign investments and technology, China was able to utilize
its excessive labor force in the best way. By adopting these labor-intensive industries, China
successfully achieved rapid economic developments through export trade in a short period.
According to the data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China’s
manufacturing has been grown faster than the average growth rate of the world. As shown in
the graph below, Chinese manufacture only accounted for 1.4% back in 1980; and its scale
was only 1/5 of the American manufacture and didn’t even entered the top 20 of global
ranking. In 2000, the annual increase in Chinese manufacturing industry has achieved
¥3.2255 trillion (about $479 billion), already accounted for 7% of the overall manufacture
around the world; and China’s global ranking also leaped to the 4th. In 2009, the increased
¥13.4265 trillion (about $2 trillion) made Chinese manufacture surpassed Japan and became
the second largest economy in the world. At this time point, Chinese manufacture has already
taken more than 15% of the world total manufacture. By 2013, China surpassed the United
States and became the world largest manufacturing economy by contributing more than 20%
to the overall world manufacture. China has undoubtedly become a major manufacturing
power of the world and it was an indispensable part of the global system of manufacture.
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In addition to the factor of industrial shift, China’s economic growth also benefited
from its own huge comparative advantage—the demographic dividend. A demographic
dividend means that a country’s working-age population accounts for a large proportion of its
total population, with lower dependency rates. It is a favorable demographic condition for
economic development and it usually generates “the accelerated economic growth that can
result from improved reproductive health, a rapid decline in fertility, and the subsequent shift
in population age structure” (Bill & Melinda Gates Institute, 2019). When the People’s
Republic of China was initially founded in 1949, the Chinese government’s attitude towards
its birth rate was pretty loose. But later in 1970s, Chinese government fully implemented
some strict birth control rules called “family planning”, the so-called “one child Policy” in
Western reporting. Because of the family planning project, Chinese society enjoyed the
demographic dividend from a light population burden (Ma, Han, 2018). This comparative
advantage was fully utilized during the industrialization process. Since the reform and
opening up, the eastern coastal cities, which firstly opened their windows for commerce, has
achieved rapid economic growth with abundant foreign capital and cheap labor resources of
China: the developments of coastal cities such as Shenzhen and Guangzhou have attracted
worldwide attention. The excessive labor force from middle and west of mainland China
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constantly flowed to the east urban areas, thus maintained the low labor cost for
manufacturing industry. Thanks to the continuous supply of cheap labor force, Chinese
manufacturing industry not only became important on a global scale, but also sparkled as a
pillar section of domestic economy. Based on the National Bureau of Statistics of China,
from 2009 to 2013, the increase in Chinese manufacture accounted for 32.8%, 32.5%, 32.0%,
31.1% and 31.5% of overall GDP respectively. The Figure 9 below provides a clear
illustration of this increasing trend. What’s more, the average rate of growth of Chinese
manufacture was 12.9% over this period, which is significantly greater than the growth rate
of China’s GDP. At the same time, manufacturing industry accounted for more than 80% of
China’s overall export, 40% of national revenue; and it provided more than 80 million jobs to
Chinese society (Bin, 2013). Obviously, the manufacturing industry was the dominant power
for China’s domestic economic growth.

However, such rapid developments were built up upon a base with fundamental flaws.
Throughout the history of the world’s manufacturing powers and their competitions between
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each other, the key factor was the competition of technology. By 2008, the developed
countries’ investments in technological development account for 86% globally; and they also
contribute to about 90% of patents for scientific and technological inventions (Liu, 2008).
From the perspective of globalization and technological developments, China as the
manufacturing power was actually in a tough spot. Even though Chinese manufacture had the
greatest contribution to the global commerce, the idea of “trading Chinese market with
foreign technology” is deeply embedded in this economic model (Chen, 2006). A great
portion of Chinese manufacturing companies heavily relied on the imported technologies
without paying much attention to self-creation and innovation. Because of this reason, many
Chinese companies completely became low-cost factories for foreign businesses and they
would go bankrupt once there’s no more foreign orders, since they already gave up
independent innovation. Thus, the technological level of China’s labor-intensive
manufacturing industry was far below the world level; and China was in lack of high-tech
enterprises that had strong world influence (Chen, 2006). In fact, many Chinese companies
and Chinese factories were at the low end of the value chain, and the key technologies are
subject to foreign countries, resulting in an unfavorable situation in which equipment/design
with high technology added value must be imported from developed countries. This issue
was a common phenomenon among Chinese companies, and it caused the unreasonable
industrial structure of China. As stated above, Chinese manufacture mainly focused on
labor-intensive industries and resource-intensive industries, without paying attention to the
technology-intensive companies, resulting in the high nominal growth yet slow real progress
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(Liu, 2008). Chinese enterprises were mostly restricted to the lower end of the value chain,
and they could only provide resources for foreign technologies to consume. Clearly, the gap
between the independent innovation capability of Chinese enterprises and developed
countries was significant.
In addition to the trap of Chinese manufactures, the gradually decreasing dividends,
especially the demographic dividend, were also a huge drawback of the old economic model.
The change in China’s demographic dividend can be divided into three stages: the first phase,
1982-2000, is the largest contribution period of the demographic dividend, which has played
a significant role in economic growth. The second phase is from 2000 to 2013. During this
period, the contribution of demographic dividend started to weaken. 2010 was a great
example: the proportion of the working population reached a high point in this year, and then
began to decline. Lastly, China is currently experiencing the third stage of 2014-2050, which
the demographic dividend becomes negative. In 2014, the population who are over 65 years
old has reached 10% of the overall Chinese population (Insight & Info Consulting Ltd, 2018).
China has become a country with severe aging. Accompanying the disappeared demographic
dividend, the labor cost of manufacturing in China has increased significantly over the past
decade. Figure 11 shows a clear trend of Chinese nominal labor cost rising, especially in the
manufacturing industry, over the past decade, with the average inflation rate being around
2.53% (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017).
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In recent years, Chinese labor price is much higher than that of some Southeast Asian
countries now. Recently, many foreign giants start to shift their factories out of China and
relocate to Southeast Asia, seeking for lower labor cost. According to Forbes China, Japanese
sensor giant OPTEX planned to transfer its manufacturing plant from China to Vietnam;
other large foreign companies, like Panasonic, Nike, Uniqlo and so on, have also taken
actions in establishing factories in Southeast Asia. Many facts prove that China’s
manufacturing plants are moving outward. China’s characteristic of “world factory”
diminishes while the global manufacturing production are decentralizing. The rise of the
Southeast Asian labor market has become more attractive than China, so the multinational
giants move their factories, chasing the low cost of production.
Furthermore, the idea of diminishing returns is also a good illustration of China’s
economic model. Initially brought up by classical economist Anne Robert Jacques Turgot and
later optimized by classical economists David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus, this idea defines
the following circumstance: when the total quantity of a production factor has achieved a
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certain level, the increase that this factor may result in the output starts to diminish (Turgot;
Ricardo, 1815; Malthus 1798). Relating China’s economic development to this concept, the
returns of keeping investing labor and capital into the low-end production has been decreased
for several years. Figure 12 is a great visualization of China’s situation following the Solow
Growth Model, indicating that the old growth model of China has come to an end, as the
marginal revenue of capital has diminished and the resources of the government and many
companies have reached their limits.

All in all, China’s economic development has made tremendous achievements in the
past 40 years. However, opportunities and challenges coexist, and China faces some
problems while the economy is developing at a rapid pace. From 1979 to 2008, China’s
economy grew at an average annual rate of 16.3%; however, the growth rate of Chinese
economy started to slow down after 2008. By 2016, China’s GDP growth rate was only 6.7%
(Liu, 2015). With the gradual disappearance of demographic dividend, resource dividends,
the problem of environmental pollution and waste of resources have become prominent,
forcing China to change its economic model and become a “green economy.” Moreover, the
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low-end products, low value-added production process, less developed technologies are
hindering China from making real progress in both technology and self-creation (Liu, 2015).
And the diminishing returns of the old economic model also marks the end of the extensive
growth. At this time point, China in urgent need of transformation and upgrading—it must
take on actions to change its situation or it would end up being eliminated from the race of
developments.
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3.2 The “new normal” of China’s economy—the economic transformation & Internet
Finance’s role
Since 2007, China’s economic growth has gradually declined. Even though the Chinese
government has implemented a series of monetary and fiscal policies, the rate of economic
growth has clearly slowed. The president of People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping claimed
that the Chinese economy has entered a “new normal”, which marks the beginning of a new
era for Chinese economy. Under the “new normal”, Chinese economy would no longer
operate in the old extensive economic growth model but would focus on revolutionizing and
upgrading. The main feature of Chinese economy entering the “new normal” is that it has
shifted from high-speed growth to medium-high-speed growth, and the economic structure
has been continuously optimized and upgraded, from resource-driven and investment-driven
to innovation-driven (Li, 2014). To be specific, from now on, China will bid farewell to the
GDP-driven growth, low-end industrial structure and regular restriction and stimulation to the
market, at the same time considering the development of technology and social welfare. It’s
important to note that Chinese government regards the tertiary industry and
consumption-oriented industries as the next pillar for Chinese economy under the “new
normal”. According to People’s Daily, throughout the history of dominant trading powers,
once the export of a certain economy hits 10% of the overall global trading, this economy
would encounter an inflection point, where its growth rate would gradually slow down.
China’s total export achieved the 10% of the world’s total in 2010; and it even reached 12.3%
in 2014. This represents that the inflection point of Chinese export growth has arrived, and
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Chinese economy must adjust based on this situation. As mentioned above in illustrating the
concept of diminishing returns, Chinese economy is already at the end stage of its extensive
growth model, it is unlikely for the old model to the maintain high export growth and a high
ratio of exports to GDP anymore. Thus, the economic growth in the future must fuel on new
sources, including the progress related to domestic consumption demand, developments by
innovation and technology, etc. These new directions of Chinese economy can work as the
“technology supplements”, which are the exogenous sources of growth. In addition to the
concept presented in the Figure 12—Solow’s growth model, Figure 13 shows a technology
augmented version of Solow’s diagram, illustrating how these technological advancements
can bring new energy to Chinese economy and stimulate new growth. Clearly, the rise of the
Fin-Tech industry coinciding with China’s economic transformation allows China to create a
“new economy”, defeating the business cycle using technological advancements and reform
of policies (Atkinson, 2006).

Among all the technical supplements, the most important motivator of the Chinese
economy’s transformation is the rapid developments in the Fin-Tech industry. The Fin-Tech
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industry is not only a main stimulator of domestic economic growth, but also a necessary
factor of the next step of Chinese economic plan: the implementation of China’s own version
of globalization— “One Belt One Road” (OBOR), also known as the “Belt and Road
Initiative” (BRI). Borrowing the name from ancient Silk Road, this initiative “aims to
promote orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources
and deep integration of markets by enhancing connectivity of Asian, European and African
continents and their adjacent seas” (Xinhua News Agency, 2015). The countries/areas
involved in this initiative are all in the developing process of their economies with a huge
space for future developments. Also, the population of these emerging economies and
developing countries accounts for more than 63% of the overall global population, so these
economies have some huge market potentials that can be converted into real growth (Wang,
2017). During 2012 to 2015, the trading volume between China and some countries along the
“OBOR”, like Thailand and Vietnam, increased significantly, created close and friendly
trading relationships between China and these countries (Wang, 2017). By exporting
investments and Chinese inventions to other countries, optimizing the pattern of economic
development and promoting coordinated economic growth across different regions/countries,
China opened a new pathway for it to generate economic growth through its new approach of
international trade.
With the implementation of the OBOR, the basic interconnection-oriented network
between China and countries along the route is under rapid construction, making the
transactions and logistics system between countries happen more smoothly. Accompanying
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China’s attempt of implementing its own style of economic globalization, the flourishing
Chinese Fin-Tech industry also faces new opportunities. Under the context of China
exporting its own brands, the Fin-Tech companies can elevate themselves by expanding their
businesses to overseas in order to develop cross-border e-commerce platforms for domestic
companies. By 2017, China has nominated 15 pilot cities for cross-border e-commerce,
including Guangzhou, Zhengzhou, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Hefei,
Chengdu, Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Suzhou, Fuzhou and Pingtan (Wang, 2017). These
cities established unique industrial parks for cross-border e-commerce, and successfully
expanded this new approach of international trading. In addition to these pilot cities, most of
big cities in China have already constructed diverse platforms for international
e-commerce—it’s fair to say that an “online silk road” is being created. As shown in the
Table 2 below, the growth rate for cross-border e-commerce has far exceeded the growth rate
of China’s overall international trading in the same period since 2011. From 2011 to 2016,
the average growth rate of cross-border e-commerce in China was 30.8%, and it even reached
50% in 2013. During the same period, the growth rate of China’s overall international trade
showed a significant decline, being less than 10% for several consecutive years. In 2014, the
growth of total international trade was only 3.4%. On the other hand, the proportion of
cross-border e-commerce in China’s import and export trade has gradually increased over
this period, from 7.6% in 2011 to 24.3% in 2016. Undoubtedly, even though the traditional
exporting industries of China were going through some tough times, the cross-border
e-commerce brought some new energies to Chinese economy.
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The support from Fin-Tech companies is important and indispensable during the
development process of large-scale international e-commerce platforms. Nowadays, China
already has thousands of Fin-Tech companies that provide online payment services, online
loan services, and other financial tools to the e-commerce platforms, allowing these platforms
to be more customer-friendly and easy to use. The Fin-Tech giants like Ant Financial provide
convenient transaction experience for both sellers and customers, improving the efficiency of
international e-commerce. Moreover, since the core idea of OBOR is to export China’s skills
and technologies to other developing countries in order to achieve co-prosperity, the export
of Fin-Tech achievements is also necessary. In the area of exporting these advanced
technologies, the Ant Financial, which is the parent group for Yu’ebao, is the best
representative. In November 2016, Ant Financial established a strategical cooperation with
Ascend Money, which is a Thai leading online payment company, and brought the inclusive
financial model of Ant Financial to Thailand through exporting technology and experiences
(Qian, 2017). In addition to Thailand, Ant Financial also expanded its business to many other
countries on the route of OBOR, including Indonesia, India and the Philippines… Because of
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Ant Financial, the extents of Inclusive Finance in these countries were also pushed up to a
new level: like everyone in China, citizens of these countries can use their phones for many
types of daily payments through Alipay App powered by Any Financial, skipping the
inconvenient process of taking out wallets and paying with cash (Qian, 2017). Ant
Financial’s export of technology to these developing countries can be considered as a pilot
exploration for the future development of Chinese Fin-Tech industry under the context of
OBOR. According to a senior director of the globalization department of Ant Financial,
exporting financial technologies to the developing countries that carry huge potential
customer group and space for development is definitely worth the price. Interestingly, Ant
Financial refers this kind of business expansion as “Glocalization”, which sums up both
globalization and localization (Zhang, 2017). Evidenced by the outcome, the effect of
“Glocalization” is significant: in April 2017, the number of users of Paytm, which is the
Indian Partner of Alipay, increased from less than 30 million to 220 million, becoming the
world's third largest electronic wallet, second only to Alipay and WeChat payment, both
China-based, and surpassing Paypal (Qian, 2017). In the senior director’s words, Ant
Financial wants to turn not only China, but also the other nearby countries on the route of
OBOR to become “cashless” in the future (Zhang, 2017). This application of financial
technology not only responds to Chinese government’s policy direction, but also further
implement the idea of Inclusive Finance in both China and OBOR countries.
All in all, with the rise of Internet finance technology, Inclusive Finance has been
further developed through the integration of technology and finance in addition to the
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traditional financial formats. Even though the Fin-Tech industry may still faces risks and
challenges, its possess a promising future. Also, the innovations and developments brought
by this new method are closely related to the spirit of “One Belt One Road” initiative. It is
not difficult to predict that the implementation of Chinese Inclusive Finance, even the global
Inclusive Finance, will experience a greater difference by making more advanced
developments in the future construction of the “One Belt One Road”.
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Chapter 4: Future directions of the Fin-Tech industry developments & Conclusion
4.1 Future directions
Under the background of the "new normal", the constantly reforming Internet finance
industry has promoted the transformation of Chinese economy. Its various genes are also
changing the original financial system of China and redefining the financial services, opening
up a huge space for new innovations and technological developments. In the new economic
model, innovations and consumptions will be the steady sources of support and motivation
for the rapid developments of Internet finance. Therefore, those Fin-Tech companies must
further develop their spirit of openness, equality, unity and sharing in order to bring better
services to customers. On the 2016 China BFSI Outsourcing Summit, Chenghui Zhang, the
president of the Financial Research Institute under the Development Research Center of the
Chinese state council, gave a speech entitled “The New Normal of Financial New Business
Services" (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 2016). In president
Zhang’s opinion, the traditional financial institutions not only need to expand their business
across industries, but also need to cooperate and to communicate with new innovations in
order to achieve a better status. More importantly, these institutions should enhance their core
business capabilities in order to remain their competitiveness. Throughout the whole speech,
the core idea presented is the future mission of the financial industry as a whole: to serve
economic transformation and industrial upgrading, including improving efficiency of
financial system, encouraging and perfecting the market development, and capital expansion.
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Under these idea, President Zhang stated three possible detailed directions for the future
development of Chinese Internet-based financial industry, as summarized in Figure 13 below.

First, since the Fin-Tech industry will become a pillar of Chinese economy, providing
stimulus to the economy thus to generate more growth, it’s necessary to strengthen the
professionalization and specialization within this industry in order to make the it capable of
taking such responsibility. By now, there are already some examples which have achieved a
relatively deep level in their fields: some focus on home mortgages and some focus on car
loans, etc. The U.S. online mortgage company, Rocket Mortgage, is a great instance,
demonstrating the optimistic future of this market (Kurt, 2019). Even though the business
fields for these companies are not wide, they are very professional and refined in their own
fields. In the future, there will be more Fin-Tech companies specializing on various specific
fields, providing more professional services to the customers. The professionalism and
specialization associated with these services can greatly refine the financial system,
improving the efficiency of the whole industry. The second direction will be the large-scale
normalization motivated by constantly improving regulations. During the early stage of
Fin-Tech industry development, especially in the online loan industry, there were many
irregular organizations in this industry, creating chaos and disturbing factor and hindering the
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whole industry from sound developments; the P2P crashes is a good illustration of the
aftermaths brought by these companies. In the future, accompanying the reform of
regulations, the development of the whole Fin-Tech industry will move towards a healthy
direction following the trend of perfecting market mechanism on the macro level: the
thresholds for online loan industry will be improved; and there will be higher requirement of
cyber security; also, the protection of legitimate interests will be strengthened. Last but not
the least, the third future direction of the Fin-Tech industry is diversification. Driven by the
increasing competitions within the whole industry, services provided by online platforms will
only become more and more comprehensive and tailored to users’ needs. Moreover, with the
gradual maturation of the Fin-Tech platforms in the urban cities, the focus of market
competition in the future should also put more focus on the rural areas, thus to further
promote the democratization of finance in those undeveloped areas. Following this trend, the
financial system of China will be expected to go through many expansions in the future.
Accompanying the possible developments of the Fin-Tech industry in the future, the
regulations and laws that this industry ought to obey will also be developed to a higher level
in the future. In order to eliminate the systemic risks associated with the Chinese Fin-Tech
industry, the regulators need to perfect the detailed standards within the industry, enhancing
the construction of a comprehensive monitor system while allowing space for Fin-Tech
companies to be creative and innovative, thus to make the Fin-Tech industry healthier in the
future.
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4.2 Conclusion
China’s financial environment and Chinese economy have been drastically changed by
the implementation of democratization of finance. As the most innovative and technical
method, the Internet-based financial industry has a broad prospect of developments under this
context. The rise of this industry is in line with the development of Inclusive Finance,
creating an industrial road for the democratization of finance: the natural attributes of
inclusiveness of the Fin-Tech industry facilitate the progress of the implementation of
Inclusive Finance, at the same time making the general public accepting this new way of
financing. So far, the scale of the Fin-Tech industry in China has grown so big that it needs to
be measured in trillions, and it has gradually become an important pillar of the overall
financial industry, supporting China’s economic plan of defeating the business cycle. It’s fair
to claim that the future development of this industry is closely associated to China’s future
economic prospects.
At the same time of crediting Fin-Tech industry for its contribution to China’s
economic transformation, it’s necessary to remember that the risks it carries are tremendous.
As discussed previously, risks associated with Fin-Tech innovations include not only risks
that are common in traditional financial industry but also Internet-related risks. Due to the
fact that Internet-based industry is fast-changing and hard to regulate, regulatory policies in
this industry should follow the constant changes and innovations and guide the Fin-Tech
industry to achieve sustainable developments. Moreover, the Fin-Tech giants like Alibaba has
already grown too big; any minor crash of it may cause an unimaginable hit to Chinese
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financial industry. Thus, it is crucial for regulators to find the delicate balance between the
development of the industry and regulatory policies in order to maintain the healthy
operations of such companies and to the continuous democratization of finance and
prosperity of Chinese economy.
Moreover, the impact of China’s democratization of finance should also be examined
from a critical perspective. Certainly, this policy greatly widened the overall access to
financial services, but it also generates significantly more leverage within the whole society.
Because of the un-matching developments between China’s domestic investment
environment and the democratization of finance, the excess money that Chinse people would
like to “finance” can only be used in speculative way, generating irrational boom in some
markets, like real estate industry, planting the seed for a possible “Minsky Moment”. This
malformed situation should be taken care of by expanding the variety of great financial assets
that masses can invest in as well as popularizing the education for financial literacy.
Through the above analysis, it’s obvious to tell that the Chinese Fin-Tech industry and
the implementation of democratization of finance in China are still in the developing stage,
featuring the coexistence of advantages and disadvantages. However, most of these
shortcomings are the ones that are associated with the current development stage, and they
can eventually be solved in the future, as long as the regulator should keep improving
legislation and refining related responsibilities. Overall, the future of Chinese Fin-Tech
industry is still promising, and it will keep play an essential role in democratization of
finance and Chinese economic transformation.
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